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Abstract
This paper reinforces the argument of Harding and Sirmans (2002) that the
observed preference of lenders for extended maturity rather than renegotiation of
the principle in the case of loan default is due to the superior incentive properties
of the former. Specifically, borrowers have a greater incentive to avoid default
under extended maturity because it reduces the likelihood that they will be able to
escape paying off the full loan balance. Thus, although extended maturity leaves
open the possibility of foreclosure, it will be preferred to renegotiation as long as
the dead weight loss from foreclosure is not too large.
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The Optimal Response to Default:
Renegotiation or Extended Maturity?
In a recent article, Harding and Sirmans (2002) examined the question of why, in
the presence of default, borrowers and lenders tend to prefer extending the maturity of the
loan rather than renegotiating the loan balance. 1 This observation is puzzling, they argue,
because, whereas renegotiation eliminates the deadweight costs of default by avoiding a
foreclosure sale, maturity extension can at best postpone that outcome. Harding and
Sirmans (2002) attempt to resolve this puzzle by arguing that extended maturity offers an
offsetting benefit by reducing two forms of agency costs in loan contracts. First, it gives
borrowers a greater incentive to invest in the asset during the term of the loan, and
second, it (possibly) reduces the tendency for borrowers to undertake practices that
increase the riskiness, or volatility, of the asset.
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on this argument in favor of maturity
extension by examining more carefully the role of agency costs in the choice of default
options in loan contracts. To that end, we consider a loan contract with a fixed maturity
date. During the term of the loan, we suppose that the borrower makes a decision that
affects the probability that he will be able to pay off the loan at maturity. In a
commercial real estate context, this could involve a choice of the level of maintenance of
the building, the choice of tenant mix, monitoring effort, or any other decision that
influences the borrower’s expected cash flow. This situation involves an agency (or
moral hazard) problem because the lender generally cannot observe and/or contract on
the borrower’s effort choice. Thus, we examine how the structure of the loan contract—
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For evidence on this, see Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) and Mann (1997).
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specifically, the lender’s response to default—affects the borrower’s incentives to invest
in effort during the term of the loan.
Our main conclusion is that borrowers will invest in greater effort under extended
maturity as compared to renegotiation. Intuitively, because extended maturity reduces
the likelihood that borrowers will be able to escape paying off the full balance of the
loan, they have a greater incentive to invest in effort that reduces the probability of
default. As a result, the moral hazard problem is less severe under the extended maturity
option because it better aligns the interests of borrowers and lenders. And, if this effect is
strong enough, it will outweigh the savings in foreclosure costs promised by
renegotiation. In this sense, our results reinforce the claims of Harding and Sirmans
(2002).

The Model
We derive the above conclusions in a model of a loan contract between a risk
neutral lender and borrower. The borrower takes out a loan of L dollars at time t=0 in
order to purchase an asset that produces an uncertain income for an infinite number of
periods into the future, beginning at t=1. Specifically, suppose that in each period
beginning in t=1, the asset produces positive income of y with probability p(e) and zero
income with probability 1−p(e), where e is the borrower’s expenditure on effort to
produce the high income state (p'>0, p <0, and p(0) p0>0).2 Thus, as of period t=0, the
″

≡

expected present value of the asset is given by
V(e) = p(e)y/r,

(1)

2

The analysis is not limited to income-generating assets. For example, we could apply it to residential real
estate by interpreting e as the borrower’s effort to earn income in the labor market.
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where r is the discount rate. In order for the initial investment to be profitable, it must be
the case that V(e)–e>L, or
p(e)y/r – e > L,

(2)

which we assume is true for all e.
Suppose that the loan matures at t=1, at which time the borrower owes principal
plus interest equal to L(1+i), where i≥0 is the interest rate on the loan. We will assume
throughout that the lender operates in a perfectly competitive market. Thus i will adjust
so that the lender expects to earn zero profit on the loan. Let the opportunity cost of
funds to the lender be equal to the discount rate r.
Suppose that the only income the borrower has to pay off the loan in t=1 is that
which is generated by the asset. We assume that
y > L(1+i),

(3)

which implies that the borrower is able to repay the loan at maturity if the high income
state occurs. However, if zero income is realized in t=1, the borrower is in default. 3 In
this case, we suppose that the lender has three possible courses of action: (i) immediate
foreclosure and forced sale of the asset, (ii) renegotiation of the principal, (iii) and
refinancing of the debt. We assume that the borrower and lender choose the option at the
time the loan is originated to maximize their joint returns, and that they cannot deviate
from that choice in the event of default. 4
Foreclosure
3

Even if the borrower has other assets with which to pay off the loan, the law of many states shields those
assets from the lender. For example, in the case of real estate, laws against deficiency judgments prevent
lenders from going after borrowers’ non-housing assets to pay off a mortgage (Harding, Miceli, and
Sirmans, 2000).
4
The parties must commit to the default option up front because, once default occurs, any previously made
choices by the borrower are sunk. Thus, the parties would have an incentive to choose that default option
which promises the lowest cost going forward. In the current context, this would always be renegotiation.
(See note 8 below.)
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Consider immediate foreclosure first. Since the asset generates expected perperiod income of p(e)y in perpetuity, its market value as of t=1 is also V(e) as defined in
(1). However, because foreclosure requires a forced sale, we assume that it entails a onetime transaction cost of T≥0. Thus, the net proceeds from a sale are V(e)−T.5 We assume
that this amount is sufficient to cover the loan balance,6 or that
V(e) − T ≥ L(1+i),

(4)

again for all e. As a result, the lender is fully repaid at maturity, regardless of whether or
not the borrower defaults. Competition among lenders therefore ensures that i=r. (We
assume without loss of generality that the borrower pays the transaction costs.)
We can therefore write the borrower’s expected return under foreclosure, as of
t=0:
R1 =

1
[p(e)(y−L(1+r)+V(e)) + (1−p(e))(V(e)−T−L(1+r))] − e.
1+ r

The first term in square brackets is the borrower’s return in the event that he pays off the
loan, while the second term is his return in the event of default. Using (1), we can
simplify this expression to
 1 − p (e) 
R1 = V(e) − L − 
T − e.
 1+ r 

(5)

The borrower therefore fully internalizes the present value of the loan as of t=0, including
the expected transaction costs, (1−p(e))T/(1+r).
Renegotiation

5

Harding and Sirmans (2002) assume that the deadweight loss is proportional to the value of the asset. Our
assumption of an additive cost is made purely for simplicity.
6
Presumably, the lender, in using the asset as collateral, would not have made the original loan unless this
condition was met.
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The second option in the event of default is for the borrower and lender to
renegotiate the loan balance. In the current model, this amounts to the lender’s forgiving
the loan in the low income state. The advantage of this option, as noted above, is that it
avoids the transaction costs of a foreclosure sale. As a consequence, however, the lender
accepts a discounted payoff (zero) in the bad state and foregoes any claim to future
income from the asset.7 Obviously, however, the interest rate will have to adjust to
ensure zero profits. Specifically, we can write the lender’s expected return from the loan
as of t=0 to be
π

= −L + p(e)L(1+i)/(1+r).

(6)

Zero expected profit requires that
1+i = (1+r)/p(e),

(7)

which implies that i>r in this case, given p(e)<1.
The expected return of the borrower under the renegotiation option is
R2 =

1
[p(e)(y−L(1+i)+ V(e))+(1−p(e))V(e)] − e,
1+ r

which can be rewritten
R2 = V(e) − p(e)L(1+i)/(1+r).

(8)

Substituting for (1+i) from (7) yields
R2 = V(e) − L − e.

(8')

Note that, for a given e, this differs from (5) only by the absence of the transaction costs
associated with foreclosure.
Extended Maturity

7

There may be transaction costs of renegotiation, but since these are almost certainly lower than the costs
of foreclosure, there is no loss in generality in assuming that they are zero.
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The third and final option in the event of default is for the borrower to refinance
the loan for one additional period, or, what amounts to the same thing, to extend the
maturity on the initial loan one period. We assume, however, that if the borrower defaults
on this extension, foreclosure and forced sale will occur with certainty. 8 Note that it does
not matter for our purposes whether the loan extension is made by the same or a new
lender, as long as both the initial and the new loan each promises zero expected profits.
Consider first the extended loan, assuming that the borrower defaulted on the
initial loan. Since the initial loan obligated the borrower to repay L(1+i) at t=1, this
amount becomes the principal for the extension. Thus, in t=2 the borrower owes L(1+i)
(1+i1) at t=2, where i1 is the new interest rate (which may or may not be equal to i). If the
good state occurs in t=2, the borrower fully repays this loan (given that y> L(1+i) (1+i1),
which we assume is true), but if zero income is realized, the asset is sold with certainty to
cover the balance. As before, we assume that the value of the asset as of t=2, net of the
transaction costs, is sufficient to cover this amount; that is, V(e)−T≥ L(1+i) (1+i1). Thus,
as under the foreclosure option, the lender expects to be fully repaid for the extended loan
regardless of the outcome in t=2. By implication, the lender who made the initial loan in
t=0 (whether the same or a different lender) also expects to be fully repaid in present
value terms, regardless of the outcome in t=1. It follows that i1=i=r.
Given these results, we can write the borrower’s expected return under the
refinancing (extended maturity) option as
R3 =

1
{p(e)(y−L(1+r)+V(e)) +
1+ r

8

If foreclosure could be continually forestalled, this option would become equivalent to renegotiation.
This is why we need to assume that the parties are able to commit at t=0 to carry out the foreclosure in t=2
if the borrower defaults.
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 1 
2
2
(1−p(e)) 
 [p(e)(y−L(1+r) +V(e)) + (1−p(e))(V(e)−T−L(1+r) )]} − e.
1+ r 

Simplifying this expression yields

 1 − p (e) 
R3 = V(e) − L − 
 T − e,
 1+ r 
2

(10)

which reflects the present value of the loan, net of expected transaction costs. Note that
this differs from (5) in that the expected transaction cost of foreclosure is delayed an
additional period.

Comparison of Default Options

We now turn to a comparison of the three default options. Since lenders earn zero
expected profits under each of them, we can rank the options simply by comparing the
borrower’s expected returns.
Fixed Probability of Default
Assume initially that p(e) is fixed and equal under the three options (i.e., the
borrower has no control over the probability of default). In that case, the comparison
depends only on the expected transaction costs. Comparison of (5), (8'), and (10)
therefore implies the following ranking for all T>0:
R2 > R3 > R1.

(11)

Renegotiation is the best option because it completely eliminates the transaction costs
associated with default. (This, of course, is the conventional argument in favor of
renegotiation.) The next best option is extended maturity because, by extending the loan
one period in the event of default in t=1, there is a chance that the borrower will be able

7

to repay it in t=2 without the need for a foreclosure sale. 9 Finally, immediate foreclosure
is the least desirable option because the transaction costs associated with a forced sale are
incurred with certainty if the borrower defaults in t=1.
Figure 1 graphs the expected returns as functions of T. Note that the relative
attractiveness of renegotiation increases with the magnitude of the transaction costs.
[Figure 1 here]
Endogenous Probability of Default
We now take into account the impact of the borrower’s choice of effort on the
expected value of the loan. As noted above, this reflects the idea that borrowers have the
ability to influence the profitability of the asset by increasing the likelihood of the high
income state. This effort could involve the provision of a labor input, maintenance of the
asset, or monitoring of workers. For simplicity, we assume that the effort choice is onetime. Thus, immediately after securing the loan at time t=0, the borrower chooses e to
maximize the present value of his expected return, taking as given the default option.
This choice of e then determines the value of p in all subsequent periods.
Under the foreclosure option, the borrower therefore chooses e to maximize (5),
yielding the first-order condition: 10
T 
y
p'(e)  +
 =1.
 r 1+ r 

(12)

Note that the resulting level of effort, e1*, is increasing in T, reflecting the borrower’s
desire to minimize the expected transaction costs.11

9

This conclusion is true for any finite extension.
The second-order conditions for this and all subsequent cases are satisfied given p"<0.
11
The effort level implied by (12) is second best because of the borrower’s need for a loan to finance
purchase of the asset. In a world in which the borrower could purchase the asset without a loan, he would
10

8

Next, under renegotiation, the borrower chooses e to maximize (8), taking as
given the interest rate, i, as determined by (7).12 The resulting effort level, e2*, therefore
solves the first-order condition
y
 1 + i 
p'(e)  − L
 =1.
 1 + r 
r

(13)

Comparison of (12) and (13) immediately reveals that e1*>e2*. The borrower exerts less
effort under renegotiation compared to foreclosure for two reasons. First, under
renegotiation, the borrower perceives that he can escape a portion of the debt in the zeroincome state, so he has less incentive to work hard to avoid that state. This is the moral
hazard problem associated with renegotiation. Second, as noted above, part of the
borrower’s effort under foreclosure is aimed at avoiding the transaction costs associated
with default, which are not present under renegotiation.
Finally, under the refinancing (extended maturity) option, the borrower chooses e
to maximize (10). The optimal effort level in this case, e3*, solves the first-order
condition
y
(1 − p(e))T 
p'(e)  + 2
 = 1.
(1 + r ) 2 
r

(14)

The borrower’s effort in this case again exceeds that under renegotiation for the same two
reasons note above (that is, e3*>e2*). Comparing (14) and (12), however, shows that the
borrower may exert more or less effort under refinancing as compared to foreclosure.
Specifically, e1*>e3* if 1+r>2(1−p), but e1*<e3* if the reverse is true.

simply maximize V(e)-L-e, yielding the first-order condition p'y/r=1. The borrower’s actual effort is higher
than is implied by this condition due to the potential transaction cost associated with default on the loan.
12
Thus, although the borrower knows that the interest rate adjusts in equilibrium to ensure zero profits for
lenders, he does not perceive the dependence of i on his choice of effort.

9

The foregoing results concerning borrower effort show that renegotiation is no
longer necessarily the best default remedy because it gives borrowers the least incentive
to avoid default in the first place. A complete comparison of the three options therefore
requires consideration of both the transaction costs of default and the impact of borrower
effort. For purposes of this comparison, we define Ri* to be the maximized value of the
borrower’s return under default option i (i=1,2,3). In what follows, we consider how
these returns vary with T, taking account of borrower effort.
Note first that when T=0 and p(e) is fixed, the three options are equivalent (see
Figure 1). If we then allow effort to be endogenous while holding T fixed at zero,
foreclosure and extended maturity remain equivalent because the borrower chooses the
same effort under each of these options (compared (12) and (14) with T=0). However,
the moral hazard problem results in too little effort under renegotiation (i.e., e2* is
independent of T according to (13)). Thus, when T=0, R1*=R3*>R2*.
Now consider what happens as T becomes positive. Differentiating (5), (8), and
(10) with respect to T, and applying the Envelope Theorem where appropriate, yields
∂R1 *
= −(1 − p (e1 *)) /(1 + r ) < 0 ,
∂T

(15)

∂R 2 *
=0,
∂T

(16)

∂R 3 *
= −[(1 − p (e3 *)) /(1 + r )] 2 < 0 .
∂T

(17)

Thus, the maximized returns are decreasing in T under foreclosure and refinancing
(though the latter is decreasing more slowly given (1−p)/(1+r)<1). In contrast, the return
under renegotiation is independent of T. Combining these result with those for the case
where T=0 yields the relationships shown in Figure 2.
10

[Figure 2 here]
Note that there are two ranges, separated by the critical value, T'. For T<T',
refinancing (extended maturity) is the optimal choice, while for T>T', renegotiation is the
optimal choice. These results reflect the trade-off between transaction costs and moral
hazard. Specifically, when transaction costs are low, refinancing is preferred because the
greater incentive for borrower effort under this option dominates the expected costs of a
foreclosure sale. However, when transaction costs are high, renegotiation is preferred
because the gain from avoiding the costs of foreclosure dominates the diminished
incentives for effort. Note finally that immediate foreclosure is never the preferred
option because it is everywhere dominated by refinancing. (Only in the extreme case
where T=0 are the two options equivalent.)

Conclusion

This paper has reinforced the conclusion of Harding and Sirmans (2002) that the
observed preference of borrowers and lenders for extended maturity rather than
renegotiation in the case of loan default can be attributed to the superior incentive
properties of the former. Specifically, extended maturity gives borrowers a greater
incentive to avoid default, as compared to renegotiation, because it reduces the likelihood
that they will be able to escape paying off some of the loan balance. Thus, although
extended maturity leaves open the possibility of foreclosure, it will nevertheless be
preferred to renegotiation as long as the deadweight costs of a foreclosure sale are not too
large.
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Ideally, one could test this conclusion empirically using a sample of firms facing
default. As Mann’s (1997) study shows, the responses of lenders vary (though the
majority prefer maturity extension). Thus, one could theoretically examine the
characteristics of those firms for which one or the other type of response was adopted and
determine whether the agency costs tend to be higher in those cases resolved by maturity
extension, as predicted by the theory. The difficulty, of course, is finding a firm-specific
proxy for the importance of these costs. This challenge is left for future work.
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Figure 1. Comparison of default options as a function of T when the probability of
default is fixed.
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Figure 2. Comparison of default options when borrower effort is endogenous.
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